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Financing affordable social housing 
in the UK; building on success?
 By Peter Williams and Christine Whitehead
1. Introduction
Housing associations [HAs] now provide some 
10% of the total housing stock in England and 
have become the majority providers, overtaking 
local authorities, in the last few years in terms of 
both total number of homes and the scale of new 
development. They are non-profit organisations, 
usually with a mission to provide affordable 
housing for lower income and other vulnerable 
households. They have existed in one form or 
another for at least two centuries. However, they 
became important in housing provision only in 
the 1970s when the UK government began to 
offer considerable capital subsidies so that they 
could expand their levels of investment using 
their own capital and government finance.
Thereafter the next big change came in 1988 
when the Conservative Government moved 
to restrict borrowing by local authorities and 
decided only to support new investment by HAs 
within a new funding regime. This involved ena-
bling HAs to set their rents to cover costs and at 
least balance their budgets and then to borrow 
on the private finance market against these 
rents. Capital grants were provided to ensure 
that rents remained affordable and building was 
concentrated in areas of need – but increasingly 
associations had to compete for that grant by 
offering more for less. Over time the rate of grant 
from government has fallen from over 90% and 
sometimes higher before 1988 to usually well 
below 25% now. Indeed new HA building now 
often involves no direct government subsidy at 
all but is funded from HA reserves and private 
borrowing.
The regime put in place in 1988 had a number of 
safeguards including strengthening the regulatory 
framework to control standards and meet pru-
dential targets. Most importantly income related 
housing allowances, now called Housing Benefit, 
provided a safety net for tenants and made the 
income stream for landlords secure. Although 
there have been many policy changes over the 
succeeding decades, as well as increasing com-
plexities in financing mechanisms, this framework 
has fundamentally remained in place to this day.
A very different part of the market also set in 
place in the mid-1980s was the ‘privatisation’ 
of local authority housing through large scale 
voluntary transfers of their housing stock1. 
Under this regime local authorities could pro-
pose a transfer to a new organisation (usually 
a housing association and normally created 
from the local authority housing department) 
100% funded by private finance. The price of 
the transfer was based on the projected income 
stream – taking account of projected rents and 
tenants’ preserved right to buy offset by the 
costs necessary to bring the housing stock up 
to a decent standard. Tenants had the casting 
vote about such transfers based on rents and 
other conditions set for the first five years. This 
transfer process enabled the improvement of the 
stock which had often become run down during 
the previous decades and it usually involved a 
positive cash transfer to the Treasury. 
Thus the mid-1980s saw the Government put in 
place a financing and regulatory regime which 
potentially involved much reduced direct govern-
ment subsidy while at the same time achieving 
large programmes of investment both in new-
build and the existing stock. This was made 
possible by developments in the private debt 
finance market. 
In this article Peter Williams and Christine 
Whitehead look back at the use of private 
finance to support social housing provision 
in the UK (and mainly England2) since 1988 
and discuss how this market might evolve in 
coming years. Part of this discussion derives 
from the findings of regular seminars hosted at 
the London School of Economics on an annual 
basis from 1989 to 1999 where stakeholders 
discussed the evolution and development of 
the private finance regime to the point where 
funding affordable housing had become a 
mainstream activity. It draws in particular on 
the presentations and discussion at two later 
seminars, one in September 2009 when the 
global financial crisis was still at its height and 
the other in September 2014 when the sys-
tem was beginning to move towards the ‘new 
normal’ both in terms of housing policy and 
financial regulation.
2.  The evolution of the private 
finance regime
Over the 26 years since 1988 it is clear that 
the private finance regime has evolved from 
an infant industry which had to be nurtured by 
government to one which is very much in the 
mainstream with credit rated housing associa-
tions and intermediaries raising bond and debt 
finance at historically low rates of interest for a 
wide range of activities that support the provi-
sion of social and affordable housing. 
In the early days HAs were reliant almost entirely 
on retail borrowing. In addition the government 
and regulator funded (with £7 capital) an inter-
mediary – The Housing Finance Corporation 
[THFC] – which could act as an aggregator to 
raise bond finance mainly for larger associa-
tions. However because of the organisation’s 
extremely limited capitalisation this could ini-
tially only operate at a small scale. 
1   As distinct from the Right to Buy introduced in 1980 which allowed individual local authority 
tenants to buy their homes at a discount. Around 2.5 million homes across the UK have been 
sold under this policy.
2   The regimes for English and Welsh associations were very similar, albeit of a different scale. 
The regimes in Scotland and Northern Ireland were somewhat different.
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The debates at the regular LSE seminar in the 
early years were almost entirely around the 
question of whether the debt finance was in 
actuality guaranteed by government. The legal 
position was straightforward – there was no 
guarantee. However the Housing Corporation – 
which acted both as the provider of government 
funding (technically in the form of a loan) and as 
the regulator, took only a second charge – pro-
tecting the private finance providers from most 
of the risks associated with lending to the sector. 
In addition the Corporation as regulator was in a 
position to restructure associations if problems 
did occur. Finally, income-related subsidies in 
the form of housing benefit provided a large 
proportion of the rental stream. In reality there-
fore this was a pretty low risk market (Pryke 
and Whitehead, 1991, 1994, 1995; Bramley in 
Turner and Whitehead, 1993). 
Even so, in the early years the interest rates 
charged were some points above the LIBOR rate 
so the system appeared quite costly. However 
rents were enabled to rise in such a way that 
reserves were built up (Chaplin et al, 1995) and 
experience grew to the point that ten years later 
interest rates for private loans were comparable 
to those found in the only other major social 
housing finance market which was fully guaran-
teed by government, the Netherlands (Priemus, 
1999). These rates were sometimes as low as 
30 basis points above LIBOR and showed very 
little variation between associations whatever 
their scale of operation, financial strength and 
level of borrowing (Whitehead, 1999). 
Thus, over the first decade the market grew 
rapidly and clearly became an important and 
healthy segment of the UK housing finance 
market. This position only started to change 
with the global financial crisis and the austerity 
and financial restructuring packages brought in 
under the Coalition government (Whitehead and 
Williams, 2011). 
The development of the social housing finance 
market remains the biggest privatisation in 
the UK with total funding now in the region of 
£59 billion in England alone with funding fore-
cast to grow by a further £25 billion to 2019, up 
£14 billion in net terms (see the annual Global 
Accounts3 produced by the regulator the Homes 
and Communities Agency – the successor body 
to the Housing Corporation). 
Since 2008 the debt market has changed 
considerably with a number of mergers and 
withdrawals from the sector. The number of 
large active lenders is now down to 5 with a 
further 10 lenders active in the market (and a 
total of 28 lenders having lent to the sector). 
Importantly, many bank loans from the late 
2000s are now unprofitable resulting in a pres-
sure from lenders to re-price when opportunities 
arise. Loan terms have shortened from 30 years 
to 10 years and the interest charge has risen 
from 25-50 basis points (bps) plus LIBOR to 130 
to 200 bps. As the HCA report notes with respect 
to housing associations in England (HCA, 2015); 
‘Increasingly, providers are using revolv-
ing credit facilities for short-term needs, 
combined with capital market funding for 
the longer term. These facilities add extra 
flexibility in terms of cost and security use 
to the relationship benefits of bank funding. 
However, the bank market is not in most 
cases meeting larger providers’ need for 
longer term funding. As a result, the basic 
treasury model of the sector is changing, 
introducing new tiers of short- (overdraft 
and revolving) and medium-term facilities to 
long-dated debt from existing bank facilities 
and the capital markets. This will in turn 
increase the refinancing needs of the sec-
tor in the next 10 years as both new and 
existing loans expire together’
This evolution has gone further with associa-
tions raising finance via private placements with 
insurers, retail bonds issued and now crowd 
funding being deployed. It is clear that the era 
of bank debt dominance at least in terms of new 
funding is over and that the landscape is now 
much more diverse. Because of the very large 
back book, bank debt will continue to be the 
largest source of funding at least for some years 
but that position will evolve especially in the 
light of growing dependence on bond finance.
Bond market issuance via the capital markets is 
now the resurgent source of funding. In 2013/14 
some £2.9 billion of bonds was issued by asso-
ciations in the debt capital markets, exceeding 
the £2.5 billion raised via bank debt. The first 
private finance was via the bond market in 1987 
and this market is now growing and evolving 
too. An increased range of institutions are buy-
ing paper and via a variety of instruments and 
structures. Typically there are pension and life 
funds looking to match long-dated liabilities with 
an index-related income stream. A further £500 
million was raised through private placements. 
The size of the bond issuance has reduced. The 
smallest issue in the year at £25 million had an 
all-in cost only slightly higher than larger issues. 
There were 2 benchmark issues of £250million 
or more and a further ten of over £100 million. 
Pricing of these issues was between 95bps 
and 140bps over gilts (Government bonds) 
with terms mainly between 30 and 35 years. 
This relatively narrow range is also reflected in 
provider credit ratings, which are all between A 
and Aa3. There were some ‘club’ issues where 
a group of associations combine their funding 
needs.
There continue to be debates as to the advan-
tages and disadvantages of bank debt or bond 
finance with some arguing that bond financing 
lacks flexibility, is more complex and more costly 
in terms of expensive arrangement processes 
and higher exit costs. However the pricing can 
be attractive, funds are available and the loan 
terms are long, which gives associations con-
siderable certainty with respect to their funding 
costs. Ultimately most large to medium sized 
associations seek to have a balanced portfolio of 
loans – short and long term, fixed and variable 
rate and bank debt and bond
During the last 3 years the Government in 
England has embraced the concept of loans and 
guarantees as distinct from grant. Driven by a 
shortage of public money and the fact that loans 
and guarantees score differently than grant in 
public expenditure terms,  2013/14 saw the first 
government guaranteed debt made available to 
providers under the Affordable Homes Guarantee 
Programme through a subsidiary of THFC. The 
guarantee backed a £500 million loan from the 
European Investment Bank [EIB] for on-lending 
to providers. This subsidiary has subsequently 
issued its own bonds. The combination of the 
government guarantee and EIB’s AAA rating 
resulted in very low on-lending rates to provid-
ers, at around 40bps over gilts. This funding 
source is only available for new development.
The sector remains an attractive lending pros-
pect for both banks and capital markets, with a 
strong asset base, predictable income streams 
and government support through Housing Benefit 
and regulation combining to produce favourable 
pricing. Despite the changes discussed earlier, 
the availability of debt through capital market 
finance has continued into 2014/15, with the 
fall in the gilt rate triggering further reductions 
in the cost. Over half of new debt raised was via 
this route. The Guarantee Programme referred 
3   See https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/414362/
Global_Accounts_2014_Full.pdf.
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to above was a new departure for government-
linked financing to the sector, while a small 
number of local authorities have on-lent from 
their Public Works Loan Board facilities.
3. Looking back
As is clear from the discussion above, by the end 
of the first decade after 1988 the market was 
pretty mature. The actors understood the nature 
of the product and the risks – and there was 
little point in regular discussion around a well 
operating system. Although there have been a 
number of ‘incidents’ over the years, the decade 
from 1999 was mainly one of steady growth with 
the only major concerns being how to expand 
social sector housing output and to substitute 
for declining grant. The market had experienced 
minimal losses and there had been only one 
insolvency. Lenders had to work hard on occa-
sions to defend their interests and government 
had taken a long while fully to engage with the 
reality of having strong private sector partners 
in the shape of lenders. But the system seemed 
strong and functional.
3.1 The position in 2009
Then everything changed. The seminar in 
September 2009 was convened in an environ-
ment of massive financial uncertainty – where 
the worst initial effects of the Global Financial 
Crisis [GFC] had been addressed but most bor-
rowing markets remained fundamentally closed. 
When the seminar was convened in 2009 we 
concluded in our report (see footnote below4) 
that a new era was emerging in contrast to the 
picture of almost continuous growth over the 
decades from 1988. We drew parallels with the 
situation in 1988 citing the following;
  Low levels of activity; rising grant rates;
  Limited capacity for leverage with few 
lenders with an appetite for lending;
  A growing interest in bonds as a means 
of funding rather than debt;
  A discussion of the potential for equity 
investment;
  A government that cut back heavily on 
public expenditure once the economy 
recovers and interest rates move back to 
200 bp above LIBOR.
We noted that the number of lenders active in 
the sector had declined – there were fewer than 
10 lenders (with a strong regional lender in both 
Scotland and Wales) with market conditions 
working against major new entrants and product 
innovation. Equity investment in associations has 
been rejected by government as a way forward, 
although individual associations were setting up 
joint ventures with the private sector. We also 
noted the important changes taking place in 
both the investment and regulatory frameworks 
which in the end proved short-lived – the Tenant 
Service Authority set up in 2008 to take over the 
regulatory functions of the Housing Corporation. 
These were then transferred to the Homes and 
Communities Agency (which had taken over the 
Corporation’s investment functions in 2008) in 
2012 when regulation was also scaled back to 
focus only on finance and governance.  
The credit crunch had significantly affected the 
situation. The shortage of funds had changed the 
dynamics of the market place with associations 
in a more vulnerable position than they had 
been previously, given the falls that had taken 
place in property prices and sales. In particu-
lar a number of associations were exposed to 
the near closure of the private housing sales 
market because of their involvement in shared 
ownership (a part rent/part buy product) which 
was used by them to provide cash flow and 
build reserves to expand investment. Some of 
these problems were being addressed by the 
Kickstart programme bringing forward capital 
grants and so enabling investment activity to 
be maintained – but that in itself puts further 
pressure on borrowing.
Overall the risks were higher and the demand 
for funding was less predictable. In our assess-
ment there was a discussion about associations 
refocussing on social rented provision secured 
with higher grant. In reality that did not hap-
pen, indeed the government stepped back from 
the provision of social housing and introduced 
‘affordable rents’ – pressuring associations to 
move to develop these homes with less grant 
and higher rents (80% of market rather than 
40% of market which is what social rents are). 
The government’s focus was on getting associa-
tions to be part of the process of helping restart 
the housebuilding industry after the downturn. 
So in 2009 we had some understanding of the 
issues that were likely to impact on price and 
availability of social housing finance but very 
little about how much would be required and 
the extent to which subsidy would be avail-
able. However the fundamentals remained. 
Associations who were in the market for bor-
rowing (remembering that this was a small 
minority of the total number, i.e. those with 
an active development programme) still had 
strong balance sheets which would in normal 
times make borrowing relatively easy. Housing 
benefit remained available for all tenants on 
low incomes and because of the emphasis on 
accommodating vulnerable households this 
meant government was providing around half 
of all rental income to associations. There was 
plenty of leeway to increase rents if necessary 
in most areas. The regulator still acted to ensure 
stability in the market and to address specific 
difficulties such as arose from certain more 
sophisticated financial instruments (interest 
rate swaps to cover fixed rate borrowing) and 
government subsidy remained a second charge. 
Overall, there was a great deal of uncertainty 
but also some optimism.
3.2  The position in 2014
At the seminar in September 2014 some of these 
uncertainties had been resolved but others had 
emerged significantly because of the reduction 
in capital grants; the move towards affordable 
(80% of market) rents and welfare reform. The 
coalition government cut grant funding for the 
period from 2010 to 2015 to £4.5 billion from 
which they expected some 170,000 units based 
on a new affordable rents policy which would 
require rents to be set at up to 80% of market 
levels. This had significant impact on HA devel-
opment programmes and plans (CCHPR, 2013)
They also, for the first time, implemented wel-
fare policies which (at the margin) removed the 
certainty that social rents would be covered by 
housing benefit. A welfare cap was introduced 
which limited the maximum an individual house-
hold could claim to roughly the median earned 
income (£500 per month for a family). This has 
had very little impact on rental income but has 
generated additional costs in supporting the 
small number of social tenants affected. More 
importantly from the point of view of rental 
income and management of the stock tenants 
are now ‘charged’ for bedrooms above the num-
ber deemed appropriate for their household size 
and structure (DWP Select Committee, 2014).
In combination these have impacted upon asso-
ciations in a variety of ways depending in part 
on the markets they are serving. Overall capital 
funding to the sector has been cut by 50%. 
Although the take up of the ‘affordable’ rent 
programme is increasing (the number of new 
affordable rent homes rose from 928 in 2011/12 
to 40,636 in 2014/15, it is at best a partial and 
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4   See http://www.thfcorp.com/docs/news/LSE%20Development%20and%20Change%20back-
ground%20paper-%2029%206%2009.pdf. 
limited solution. Rather ominously new homes 
built for social rent fell from 36,713 in 2010/11 
to 6,192 in 2014/15 – although there will be a 
very large one-off increase in 2015/16. 
As one of the speakers at the seminar (a finance 
director) highlighted, the prudent approach 
adopted at his association included a sensi-
ble debt service ratio, no reliance on sales to 
meet obligations, an active asset management 
strategy and a forward funding programme. 
He questioned the tensions between the new 
affordability regime and the social purpose of the 
association but recognised the need to balance 
out competing objectives around social purpose, 
affordability, welfare dependency and increasing 
supply. A second speaker, a funding advisor, 
reminded us of the successes of the private 
finance regime along with what he called the 
minor misdemeanours around stand-alone and 
structured derivatives, both of which were in the 
process of being worked out of the system. More 
critically from his point of view was the reliance 
on bank debt which was now unprofitable but 
which was also constraining associations via 
covenants and the banks’ unwillingness to allow 
HAs to refinance. He also highlighted some of 
the problems with regulation. It had led to a 
lack of credit differentiation (and the survival 
of mediocre associations), strong credit ratings 
unduly reliant on regulation and regulation had 
induced passivity on the part of HA boards. The 
implicit guarantee provided by regulation also 
meant lenders were unlikely to face default and 
repossession because a transfer of engage-
ments would take place. He asked why HAs 
need the current form of regulation.
A third speaker who was involved at the outset 
of the private finance regime in the UK took up 
this point. She put considerable stress in her 
closing remarks on the continued importance 
of regulation to get secure low margins (and 
ensure access for all sizes of HA from the full 
range of funders). She reflected that in the late 
1980s long-term finance from banks was not 
envisaged, and this led to the creation of THFC 
to give access to the bond market and longer 
term finance. This is a role THFC has continued 
to play (along with helping ensure access to 
smaller long-term fixed rate loans from the bond 
market). She was not persuaded that equity 
investment made sense given housing providers 
want long-term ownership of properties. A 2003 
study had demonstrated there was a deep mar-
ket for revolving credit facilities (borrowers pay 
a fee to secure access to funds as and when 
they need it) of up to 10 years from banks and 
long-term bonds, albeit it was several years 
before the demand for this emerged (Joseph 
and Terry, 1997). 
 She asked what might provide the equity/sub-
sidy to enable social housing development in the 
absence of government support. She highlighted 
good treasury management and the issue of 
good timing for the drawdown of loans (a £250m 
bond with saving of 10bps gives £¼m saving per 
annum) along with the right balance of fixed and 
variable loans plus appropriate use of hedging 
instruments. She also laid considerable stress 
on good asset management to strengthen the 
balance sheet. She set out 3 areas where she 
thought new capacity could be found:
1. If associations could exploit planning 
gain with government requiring 50% of 
the increase in land values to be used to 
support social housing 
2. The potential for infill development on 
local authority-owned land which would 
remain in LA hands and be financed by 
an increase in LA borrowing capacity and, 
finally; 
3. She felt that tax breaks specifically for 
institutional investment in social housing 
should be introduced. 
She concluded that private finance is not the 
problem, finding subsidy for the core business 
of social housing is.
4.  The current position and 
looking to the future
4.1  The policy environment 
The election of a majority Conservative govern-
ment in 2015 means that in some ways there is 
greater certainty than under any other outcome 
but in others the future is far less clear.
On the certainty side the scale of funding is already 
set. The Government’s 2015-2018 Affordable 
Homes Programme is aiming to produce 165,000 
homes from £1.7bn as compared to the 170,000 
plus from triple that amount over the five years 
from 2010-2015. This is to be achieved by the 
continuation of the affordable rents regime and 
the guarantee scheme which reduces the costs of 
borrowing together with much greater emphasis 
on bringing forward public land for housing. This 
will provide additional subsidy in kind to the extent 
that the land is provided in partnership between 
the owners and housing providers and from the 
results of negotiations with respect to planning 
obligations to provide affordable housing. However 
it will also undoubtedly use up HA reserves and 
there are concerns among some that there is 
inadequate balance sheet strength available. 
One response to the increased funding require-
ment and to the needs of households who in 
the past would have become owner-occupiers 
but currently are not able to do so, has been to 
become increasingly involved in market hous-
ing provision. HAs are helping to build for the 
owner-occupied market, especially for shared 
ownership and shared equity products and also 
to build for market and intermediate rent products. 
This approach can increase profits which can 
be recycled into additional investment, provide 
for a range of households no longer able fully to 
fund themselves and diversify HA activities into 
the management of mixed tenure developments 
(Williams et al, 2012).  
One of the most significant factors on the 
uncertainty side is the impact of further welfare 
reforms. The new regime for HA rents sets maxi-
mum increases at Consumer Price Index [CPI] 
plus 1% but welfare payments are to be held 
constant for 2 years and will then rise only with 
CPI while housing benefit also rises with CPI not 
with actual rents. The expectation is therefore 
that HAs will not always be able to increase rents 
by the maximum as tenants will not always be 
able to pay such increases. More fundamental is 
the announced reduction of the welfare cap to 
£23,000 per annum. The cap is also likely to be 
further reduced during the current Parliament to 
£21,000. At that level many mainstream families, 
especially single parents with 2 children, who are 
wholly dependent on welfare payments will not 
have all of their rent paid. These changes and 
others that could be introduced will have three 
main impacts on HAs – their rental income will 
no longer be as secure, they will have to use 
additional resources to deal with the shortfall in 
rental income and they will have to support their 
tenants in the more difficult environment (NHF, 
2014; Grant Thornton, 2015; Clarke et al, 2015 
forthcoming). 
A longer term concern lies in the government’s 
commitment to move to a Universal Credit regime 
within which housing benefit is no longer directly 
identified and tenants pay their own rents. The 
potential for large increases in rent arrears arising 
from this regime is recognised as an important 
problem. However, the most immediate uncer-
tainty however arises from the Manifesto policy 
to give HA tenants the Right to Buy their prop-
erty (extending earlier legislation on the Right 
to Acquire and the preserved Right to Buy for 
tenants in place when Local Authority dwellings 
were transferred to LSVT HAs. We discuss this in 
more detail below. 
4.2  Financial developments
As touched upon earlier, associations have 
now moved into a new era where the ‘terms 
of trade’ are being substantially rewritten on a 
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continuing basis (usefully discussed in KPMG, 
2011, Standard and Poor, 2102; Chevin, 2013). 
Over the five years to 2015 this triggered much 
reflection on where associations might go in 
terms of funding and role (see, for example, the 
series of papers prepared by a major London 
association, London and Quadrant in conjunc-
tion with PWC (2010-2012) and the view of the 
ratings agencies; Moody (2013 and 2014). With 
reduced government finance, associations were 
under considerable pressure to diversify their 
activities to include more profitable but more 
risky private sector initiatives which might pro-
duce profits and thus a stream of income which 
could be used to cross-subsidise their social 
rented development. Clearly not all associations 
could or would do this. Some (typically smaller) 
associations simply reduced activity to reflect 
new circumstances. Others set up subsidiaries 
which undertook housebuilding, employment 
services, private renting and indeed functions 
outside of housing altogether such as provision 
of leisure facilities. Some associations resolved 
to sell stock on a regular basis to balance their 
books. The diversification that has taken place 
is still modest in relation to the stock as a whole 
but is indicative of the tensions that exist. 
These developments have prompted a con-
tinuing debate as to ways ahead regarding 
funding. Some have asked whether institu-
tional investors would become major players in 
the affordable housing market by for example, 
buying freeholds and leasing homes back to 
associations (JLL, 2014) or the creation of a 
social equity fund (PWC and L&Q, 2012). Equally 
government could take equity stakes (Walker, 
2014). Alternatives have also included moving 
to market rents (PWC and L&Q, 2012) and the 
creation of a new regime of ‘living ‘ rents linked 
to local incomes (JRF and NHF, 2015) as well, 
of course of restoring grant funding (Capital 
Economics, 2015). 
It is not evident that the Government is willing 
to embrace any of these suggestions. For the 
moment it has settled on continuing their policy 
of realising assets by selling HA homes to their 
tenants (see below). This aims to secure the dual 
objectives of enhancing home ownership and 
generating receipts for new building topped up 
by a requirement that local authorities sell their 
most expensive housing stock, the practicalities 
of which have been challenged by many (eg, 
Kerslake, 2015). 
5.  Conclusions
It is evident from this review that over a quar-
ter of a century the private finance regime for 
social housing in the UK has been a successful 
initiative. However it has not been unchanging 
nor unproblematic. The market has shown a 
degree of volatility arising from both policy and 
market conditions. In retail debt funding terms it 
is undoubtedly currently in a contraction phase. 
Initiatives looking to increase equity finance 
have as yet been relatively small and confined 
to new mixed tenure developments. 
Current concerns are exacerbated by a number 
of outstanding issues around the future strength 
of the association sector and its regulatory and 
financial environment. These will undoubtedly be 
condition lender appetite going forward. However 
there have been many times in the past when 
HAs and the financial institutions have rung warn-
ing bells but there has generally been relatively 
little subsequent negative impact. 
Most recently the new government has set out 
its intention to introduce a Right to Buy policy for 
all tenants of housing associations in England. 
While some existing association tenants have 
enshrined rights (both preserved Right to Buy 
as stock transfer tenants and Right to Acquire 
for tenants in homes built post 1997 – probably 
in excess of 1.2 million tenants -around half of 
the total number of HA tenants) higher discounts 
and shorter ‘waiting’ period mean that take up 
is likely to increase. An important issue is that 
the new policy might threaten the HA sector’s 
status as private bodies and ultimately whether 
the private finance they have raised will count 
instead as public debt. This would be so much 
of an own goal for government that it is probable 
that the policy will be developed so this is not 
the case – the fact that the discounts are paid 
for from sales of more expensive local authority 
properties rather than the HA is part of this story. 
However there are currently clear concerns not 
just about the status of the sector’s debt but also 
with respect to the value for money for associa-
tions in continuing development programmes 
which might simply generate sales. 
At this stage there is no real evidence on the 
financial impact of such a sales policy nor on 
the flow of receipts that might be generated to 
enable additional building. However it highlights 
the policy risks that still surround this sector, 
driven by both its continued reliance on public 
subsidy (if not grant then housing benefit and 
ultimately un-hypothecated Universal Credit) 
and the underlying drive by the government 
to promote home ownership (especially given 
the decline of that tenure in the last decade).
At the same time the HA sector has shown 
considerable resilience and has now built up 
a significant asset base with a substantial 
rental flow. This gives the sector the capac-
ity to ride out some of the storms that come 
its way. Associations have shown a consider-
able capacity to adapt to new circumstances 
although in so doing some have reduced their 
role in relation to the poorest households and 
most are looking to strengthen their activity in 
the middle ground of the housing market. Most 
recently the Chair of the Communities and Local 
Government Select Committee has announced 
his intention to ask the Committee to examine 
how housing associations use their surpluses 
with a focus on whether more could be done 
(Inside Housing, 2015). In 2013/14 the sector in 
England generated a surplus of £2.4bn although 
it is important to note that cumulative reserves 
are taken into account by lenders and so affect 
the terms available. 
One important issue tied up with the regula-
tory regime and the capacity to fund their own 
investment is that of mergers and take-overs. 
Even though there has been considerable 
restructuring it is still not unusual for a local 
authority to have to work with dozens of HAs, 
some large, some small, generating high costs 
for both groups. More generally it means that 
scale economies are not being realised. The 
regulator has in the past called for more sys-
tematic restructuring of the sector and this call 
is likely to be reiterated in the new environment. 
This issue of industry structure is one element 
of a much more fundamental problem. The 
regime set up in 1988 offered few incentives 
to HAs to reduce their costs and to operate 
more efficiently. Bidding for grant put some 
limited pressure on new-build efficiency but 
more generally higher costs could be covered 
by higher rents with the government taking the 
strain through higher housing benefit payments. 
Changes in the welfare system are beginning to 
put some pressure on associations to increase 
efficiency but there is a long way to go. The 
means by which government might address 
this issue are as yet unclear – but they could 
significantly increase risks for financial institu-
tions, highlighting once again the constraints 
of policy imposed by putting in place a private 
finance regime. 
The private finance regime for housing associa-
tions in England and the UK is recognised as 
having been one of the biggest success stories 
of the era of privatisation. It allowed govern-
ment significantly to reduce grant funding and 
to bring a new commercialism to the sector. 
That process has continued to evolve, with 
associations as not for profit social businesses 
now setting out plans substantially to increase 
housing output both for renting and owner-
occupation – subject of course to government 
Financing affordable social housing in the UK; building on success?
not damaging their capacity to do so. Without 
doubt there is the potential for the sector to 
do more and it is evident there is a continued 
appetite from funders to support their activities. 
Now the challenge for the HA sector is to absorb 
the impact of welfare reform and government 
cutbacks while fulfilling its evident potential to 
be a major contributor to solving the housing 
crisis in England. 
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